

# WORKING DRAFT

Is the rate of deployments sustainable at a peacetime rotational rate of 1:2 AC / 1:5 RC?

In January 2007, the SECDEF issued a memorandum entitled **“Utilization of the Total Force”** in which he stated the planning objective for involuntary mobilization of the Guard/Reserve units would remain one year mobilized to five years demobilized, and the planning objective for the Active Force would remain one year deployed to two years at Home Station. For the Reserve Component, the merits of this policy were illuminated in the September 2007 Defense Science Board report entitled **“Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism”** which stated “discussions with representatives of the National Guard, the Reserves, employers, family members, and state governors demonstrated a consensus that 1:5 dwell time would satisfy their needs for predictability and sustainability.”

Some four years later in late 2011, the Secretary of the Army, HON John M. McHugh, issued an **“Army Deployment Period Policy”** memo which stated that Army General Purpose Forces supporting named operations outside the continental United States would transition from a 1 year deployment period to a 9 month deployment period beginning 1 January 2012. The memo also stated that the Department of the Army “....will refine and adjust future deployment period policies based on global security conditions and Combatant Commanders’ requirements.” According to the RAND study **“Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan,”**

“As of December 2011, roughly 73 percent of AC Soldiers had deployed to Iraq and/or Afghanistan.... Most of these Soldiers were working on their *second, third, or fourth year of cumulative deployed duty*. Most of the remaining 27 percent who have not yet deployed are recent recruits, are forward-stationed in other overseas locations, or have contributed to operations in Iraq and/or Afghanistan by directly supporting the mission from the continental United States (e.g., intelligence analysts or recruiters). The Army, therefore, retains very little unutilized capacity to deploy additional AC Soldiers without *lengthening deployments or shortening the time between deployments, both of which increase the burden on those who have already deployed.....*” (Italics added for emphasis).

Since the January 2012 Secretary of the Army memo, the 9 months deployment length (Boots on the Ground or BOG) policy and the Active Component Deployment to Dwell (D2D) force rotation rate of 1:2 and the Reserve Component Mobilization to Dwell (M2D) force rotation rate of 1:5 have remained in effect.

The current demand for Army capability is sufficiently high that one third of the Active Army is either deployed, forward-stationed, or is a CONUS-based assigned or allocated force. Despite this significant commitment of Army capability in support of global requirements, the Army G-3/5/7 noted in 2015 closed hearing testimony that “the Army has not benefitted significantly from a reduction in Iraq and Afghanistan requirements because the decrease in base demand has been supplanted by growth in emergent demand.” Further, in order to meet the SECDEF’s guidance of an Active Component force

rotation rate of 1:2, the G-3/5/7 stated that the Army would need to utilize assigned forces from other Combatant Commands to meet existing demand.

During 2014 - 2015, Russia invaded the Ukraine, ISIL established a stronghold in Iraq, Boko Haram instigated a pogrom against non-Muslims in Africa, US troop strength in Afghanistan was not reduced to approximately 5K as initially planned, and the US provided military enabler support to West Africa in response to the Ebola outbreak. For each of these “emergent” (unplanned) requirements, the Army responded by deploying additional forces above/beyond that which had already been assigned or allocated for the Fiscal year to support these emergent requirements in the CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and EUCOM theaters of operation.

In addition, demand on the force has been assessed by Career Management Fields (CMFs) and unit types based upon simulations as well as actual data:

a. In July 2011, the USMA Operations Research Center of Excellence (ORCEN) published the results of their ARFORGEN / BOG Dwell Simulation. ORCEN was tasked to estimate the individual dwell statistics by grade for many critical Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs). They included Brigade Combat Team (BCT) centric Career Management Fields (CMFs), Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) CMF's, and some critical enabler MOS's including Engineers, Signal, Military Police, Military Intelligence, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The simulation team ran a “steady state” simulation analysis representing a 20-year period beginning 1 Oct 2014 where the AC Demand scenario was 1 Corps, 3 Divisions, 15 BCTs, and 41K Enablers. The team modeled Army end strength of 463,398 personnel, a RIP-TOA overlap of 25 days, and a deployment length of *1 year (1 year BOG)*. After running their simulation, the team concluded from the results that more than 75% of the Soldiers in these CMFs failed to experience a 1:2 BOG:Dwell ratio.

b. A May 2014, TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) report “**Army End Strength Analysis**” analyzed the implications of various Active Army end strength targets (490K or 60 BCTs, 450K or 52 BCTs, 420K or 46 BCTs) on OSD's Integrated Security Construct (ISC) scenarios and concluded that, “...an Army equipped with 52 BCTs would possess the capacity to execute a national strategy of Defend/Defeat/Deter, but would do so with considerable risk. This risk was due to mitigation strategies (e.g., early deployments and *combat tour extensions*) necessary to meet the nation's demands.....an Army at 46 BCTs would fail to meet the necessary demands, even with the wholesale application of high-risk mitigation strategies.” (Italics added for emphasis).

d. In their report “**Paid Duty Days for Army Guardsmen and Reservists, 2000-2013**”, RAND reviewed paid duty days for Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) Selected Reserve Soldiers who are “not mobilized, who are not Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) or Reserve Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), and who have completed initial entry training. In their report, RAND notes that for these part-time Soldiers “the median number of paid duty days did not change much between FY 2000 and FYs 2010 to 2013.” However, since 2000, in both the ARNG and

USAR, there has been an increase in the number of non-mobilized “part time” Soldiers who have performed 360 days or more. For example, in FY 2000, there were 2,172 ARNG and 195 USAR Soldiers who performed 360 days or more of duty compared to 4,466 ARNG and 907 USAR Soldiers who performed 360 days or more of duty in FY 2013.

On 7 July 2015, the Army announced it would continue to reduce its end strength from 490,000 to 450,000 AC Soldiers (52 BCTs). In light of this announcement, the Commissioners asked several Combatant Commanders during closed hearings if they were receiving all of the force capability they required to execute their mission sets. Universally, each Combatant Commander expressed that even at current force levels (490K); there is unsourced demand for capability that posed risk to their shaping, preventing, and deterring actions in support of the Unified Campaign Plan.

Army global commitments have not and will not decrease for the foreseeable future. In fact, the threat to US interests has increased over time rather than decreased. As outlined in the **2015 National Military Strategy**, the operational environment for the next two decades will be characterized by significant threats to US national and international interests. For the past decade, the US has focused on Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) at home and abroad, but threats posed by re-emergent state actors such as Russia, Iran, North Korea and China have *increased* risk to US security interests. These threats, coupled with rapidly evolving technology, cyber threats, and the emergence of youth populations in the resource-constrained continents of Asia and Africa, are creating a more dynamic and volatile global environment in which to operate. In a recent **Small Wars Journal** article entitled “**Don’t Cut the Army,**” Dr. Joseph J. Collins, Director of the Center for Complex Operations in the National Defense University opined,

“In the immediate future, we will be calling on our ground forces to maintain a high level of readiness for short notice contingencies, establish presence in critical areas, continue their advisory and training efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, deter North Korean aggression, and enhance deterrence in a Europe noticeably frightened by a resurgent Russia. While we should do more in Iraq and Afghanistan, the increased threat in Europe is vitally important. At a minimum, the United States should resolve to station a reinforced heavy division in Poland to signal the Russians that Poland and the Baltic nations will not be treated like the Ukraine. U.S. soldiers should also bring much needed aid and training to Ukrainian forces. With all this on our plate, cutting the Army now makes no sense.”

### **Conclusion:**

The Army’s current AC 490K end-strength cannot sustain the current DoD rotational planning policy of D2D 1:2 and M2D 1:5 because the Army cannot consistently achieve the rotation rates of 1:2 AC and 1:5 RC today. A reduction in AC force end-strength to 450K further exacerbates our capability shortfall and will increase stress on the force.